CrowdStrike
Pulls every host CrowdStrike Falcon has an agent on, with the full host record — hardware, OS, network identity, agent state and grouping.
| Type name | crowdstrike_integration |
| Creates | Endpoints |
| Runs on | A sensor with outbound reach to the Falcon API |
| Presence flag | cs_exits |
| Field prefix | cs_ |
What it contributes
CrowdStrike is usually one of the strongest sources in the inventory, because an EDR agent reports from inside the host. Expect it to be authoritative for:
- Identity — hostname, machine domain, OU, site name, CrowdStrike device ID
- Network — local IP, external IP, MAC, connection IP and MAC, default gateway
- Platform — OS version, build, kernel version, product type, service pack
- Hardware — system manufacturer and product, BIOS manufacturer and version, serial number, chassis type, CPU vendor and signature
- Agent state — agent version, first and last seen, last reboot, RTR state, reduced functionality mode, provision status, host groups and tags
- Host state: last logged-on user, the criticality set in Falcon, containment and safe-mode state, deployment type, and whether the prevention and sensor update policies are applied
Alongside its own cs_* fields it writes the shared asset fields, so its hosts
correlate against every other source. See Exported fields for
the complete list.
Requirements
The integration is outbound-only: it is a scheduled API client, so nothing is installed on the CrowdStrike side, nothing runs on the endpoints themselves, and nothing has to reach into the deployment.
Network access
| From | To | Protocol | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| The sensor running the integration | The Falcon API host for your region, e.g. api.us-2.crowdstrike.com | HTTPS over TCP | 443 |
Both the token request and every page of device records go to that same host, so one egress rule covers the whole integration. Open it for your region's host — see the region warning under Configuration — and if the sensor reaches the internet through a proxy, point Proxy settings at it rather than opening direct egress.
Access in CrowdStrike
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
| An account that can create API clients in the Falcon console | The credential is created under Support and resources → API clients and keys, which is admin-gated. See Creating the API client |
| The Hosts: Read scope on that client | The only scope the integration uses — it enumerates hosts and reads nothing else |
No Falcon console user is created or consumed at run time; the integration authenticates as the API client only.
In this deployment
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
| A registered, healthy sensor | The integration runs on a sensor, on the platform's schedule — see Sensors |
There are no special host requirements beyond a sensor that is checking in. The work is a handful of HTTPS calls per run, so it adds no meaningful load and needs no local storage.
Configuration
| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Name | Yes | Label for this instance |
| API URL | Yes | The Base URL shown when the API client was created, e.g. https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com |
| Client ID | Yes | The Client ID of the Falcon API client |
| Client Secret | Yes | The Secret shown once at creation |
| Proxy settings | No | http://host:port if the sensor egresses through a proxy |
| Sensor | Yes | Sensor that will run the integration |
| Ignore SSL | Yes | A checkbox; leave it unticked against the real API. The host collector does not currently apply it: certificates are always validated |
The client secret is write-only. Once saved, the console shows it as a locked box with Replace; it is never displayed again and is sent only to the sensor.
Test connection requests a token and then reads one device from the host listing, so it proves the Hosts: Read scope as well as the credentials, and reports how many devices the client can see.
api.crowdstrike.com, api.us-2.crowdstrike.com, api.eu-1.crowdstrike.com and
api.laggar.gcw.crowdstrike.com are different clouds. Credentials issued in one
region will not authenticate against another, and the failure looks like a bad
secret rather than a wrong host.
Creating the API client in CrowdStrike
In the Falcon console, go to Support and resources → API clients and keys and choose Create API client. Give it a name that identifies this integration, and grant it exactly one permission:
| Scope | Access |
|---|---|
| Hosts | Read |
Nothing else is needed — the integration only enumerates hosts.
On save, CrowdStrike shows three values. Copy all three; they are what you enter when creating the integration instance:
| Falcon shows | Enter it as | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Client ID | Client ID | 1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b9c0d1e2f3a4b5c6d |
| Secret | Client secret | shown once, at creation |
| Base URL | API URL | https://api.us-2.crowdstrike.com |
CrowdStrike shows the secret exactly once, on this screen. If it is lost, reset it on the existing client rather than creating a second one — one credential per integration keeps the audit trail readable.
The Base URL on that screen is the cloud your tenant lives in — use it verbatim
as the API URL rather than assuming api.crowdstrike.com.
The integration then authenticates with the OAuth2 client-credentials flow against
/oauth2/token and pages /devices/combined/devices/v1.
Scan template options
| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Ignore of host is offline | No | A duration. Hosts whose last check-in is older than this are skipped |
| Virtual interface ranges | No | Comma-separated addresses or CIDRs of virtual interfaces (pod networks, VPN pools) that are never taken for a host's Private IP. Added to the built-in list of Docker, VPN, link-local and similar ranges |
Exported fields
Each host returned by /devices/combined/devices/v1 becomes one asset record. The
integration copies the Falcon device attributes into fields prefixed cs_, keeping
the CrowdStrike name so a value in the platform can always be traced back to the
device record it came from, and additionally writes the shared fields that make the
host correlate with other sources.
Three kinds of record are dropped before anything is written: a host with no
agent_version, a host whose cs_last_seen is older than the Ignore of host is
offline window in the scan template's advanced settings, and a retired
enrolment. When a machine is re-imaged or re-enrolled it gets a new device ID,
and Falcon keeps listing the old one for a while; if the old agent stopped before
a newer agent on the same hardware (same serial number and model) first checked
in, the old record is skipped so its stale state does not overwrite the live
agent's.
Identity
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_exits | Boolean | Always true — the presence flag marking this asset as CrowdStrike-covered |
cs_device_id | Text | Falcon device ID (AID). The primary key used to match the host on later runs |
cs_cid | Text | Customer ID of the Falcon tenant the sensor is enrolled in |
cs_hostname | Text | Hostname as the sensor reports it |
cs_machine_domain | Text | Domain the machine is joined to |
cs_ou | Text | Organisational unit path — an array in the source record |
cs_site_name | Text | Active Directory site name |
cs_serial_number | Text | Chassis serial number |
Agent state
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_agent_version | Text | Full sensor version |
cs_agent_version_major | Text | Derived — the first two components of the version, e.g. 7.14 from 7.14.18110. Use it to group an estate by sensor generation |
cs_agent_load_flags | Text | Sensor load flags |
cs_agent_local_time | Date/time | Host's local clock at the time the sensor last reported |
cs_status | Text | Host status, e.g. normal, containment_pending, contained |
cs_provision_status | Text | Provisioning state of the sensor |
cs_reduced_functionality_mode | Text | Whether the sensor is running degraded |
cs_rtr_state | Text | Real Time Response availability on the host |
cs_config_id_base | Text | Sensor configuration base ID |
cs_config_id_build | Text | Sensor configuration build ID |
cs_config_id_platform | Text | Sensor configuration platform ID |
Network
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_local_ip | IP | Local address of the host |
cs_external_ip | IP | Address the host is seen from on the internet |
cs_connection_ip | IP | Address the sensor connected to Falcon from |
cs_default_gateway_ip | IP | Default gateway on the host's network |
cs_mac_address | Text | MAC of the host's primary adapter |
cs_connection_mac_address | Text | MAC of the adapter used for the Falcon connection |
Operating system
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_platform_id | Text | Numeric platform code |
cs_platform_name | Text | Platform name — Windows, Mac, Linux |
cs_os_version | Text | OS version string |
cs_os_product_name | Text | OS product name |
cs_os_build | Text | OS build |
cs_build_number | Text | Build number |
cs_major_version | Text | Major OS version |
cs_minor_version | Text | Minor OS version |
cs_kernel_version | Text | Kernel version |
cs_service_pack_minor | Text | Service pack minor version |
cs_product_type | Text | Windows product type code — workstation, domain controller or server |
cs_product_type_desc | Text | The same product type, in words |
cs_pointer_size | Text | Pointer width — distinguishes 32-bit from 64-bit hosts |
Hardware
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_system_manufacturer | Text | System manufacturer |
cs_system_product_name | Text | System model |
cs_bios_manufacturer | Text | BIOS manufacturer |
cs_bios_version | Text | BIOS version |
cs_cpu_vendor | Text | CPU vendor |
cs_cpu_signature | Text | CPU signature |
cs_chassis_type | Text | Chassis type code |
cs_chassis_type_desc | Text | Chassis type in words — often the quickest way to separate laptops from servers |
Grouping and tags
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_groups | Text | Falcon host group IDs the host belongs to — an array in the source record |
cs_group_hash | Text | Hash of the host's group membership |
cs_tags | Text | Falcon sensor and grouping tags — an array in the source record |
Host state and policies
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_last_login_user | Text | Last user to log on, as Falcon reports it. Stored only: owner detection is the CrowdStrike asset owner integration's job |
cs_last_login_user_sid | Text | SID of that user |
cs_last_login_timestamp | Date/time | When that logon happened |
cs_criticality | Text | Criticality assigned to the host in Falcon, as Falcon words it |
cs_filesystem_containment_status | Text | File system containment state |
cs_safe_mode | Text | Whether the host is in safe mode |
cs_deployment_type | Text | How the sensor is deployed |
cs_linux_sensor_mode | Text | Linux sensor mode, on Linux hosts |
cs_prevention_policy_id | Text | ID of the prevention policy assigned to the host |
cs_prevention_policy_applied | Boolean | Whether that prevention policy is applied |
cs_sensor_update_policy_id | Text | ID of the sensor update policy assigned to the host |
cs_sensor_update_policy_applied | Boolean | Whether that sensor update policy is applied |
cs_uninstall_protection | Text | Uninstall protection state, from the sensor update policy |
cs_policies_not_applied | Text | Types of every policy assigned to the host but not applied. Empty when all are applied |
Timestamps
| Field | Type | Holds |
|---|---|---|
cs_first_seen | Date/time | When the host first reported to Falcon |
cs_last_seen | Date/time | When the host last reported. Also drives the offline drop rule above |
cs_last_reboot | Date/time | Last reboot of the host. Left empty when Falcon reports none, which is usual for Linux and Mac hosts |
cs_modified_timestamp | Date/time | Last change to the device record |
cs_slow_changing_modified_timestamp | Date/time | Last change to the rarely-changing part of the device record |
Shared fields it writes
These are the normalised, source-independent fields. They are what other integrations correlate against, so their values are cleaned up rather than copied verbatim:
| Shared field | Derived from |
|---|---|
names | The short hostname from cs_hostname |
fqdn, domains | The fully qualified name and its DNS domain, built from cs_hostname and cs_machine_domain (or taken from a hostname that is already qualified). Merged with other sources' values. Not written for a workgroup host or a NetBIOS-only domain |
private_ip | The machine's real address: cs_local_ip when it is a private address and not a virtual interface, otherwise cs_connection_ip under the same test, otherwise nothing. Virtual interfaces are the built-in ranges, the template's Virtual interface ranges, and any local address that three or more differently named hosts in the same run report while connecting from elsewhere |
last_public_ip | cs_external_ip |
mac | Both cs_mac_address and cs_connection_mac_address, in canonical spelling, primary first. Merged into the field, so MACs other sources saw on the machine are kept. Placeholder MACs shared by many machines (all zeros, broadcast, the Apple internal adapter, a common VPN virtual adapter) are never written |
os | cs_os_version, normalised to a canonical name such as Windows 11 or Ubuntu 20.04 |
os_vendor | cs_platform_name, normalised to Windows, Linux or MacOS |
type | From Falcon's product type: Workstation becomes Endpoint, Server and Domain Controller become Server. Only when Falcon does not say is it inferred from the normalised os |
criticality | cs_criticality mapped to Critical, High, Medium or Low. Written only when the asset has no criticality yet, so a rating set in the platform is never overwritten; Falcon's unassigned value writes nothing |
hw_vendor | cs_system_manufacturer |
hw_product | cs_system_product_name |
updated_at | Time of the run that produced the record |
The asset's first seen comes from cs_first_seen, when the agent first checked
in, and its last seen from cs_last_seen; last seen only ever moves forward, so
a newer sighting by another integration is kept.
os is a normalised value and cs_os_version is what CrowdStrike literally
reported. When a host looks wrong in a report built on os, compare it against the
cs_* field to tell a normalisation gap from a genuine reporting difference.
How hosts are matched
Each host is matched to an existing endpoint by the first of these that finds one:
- The same Falcon device ID.
- The endpoint of the agent this one replaced on the same hardware: same serial number and model, and the old agent stopped before the new one started. This keeps a re-imaged or re-enrolled machine on its own asset even when its name changed. Serial numbers that firmware fills with a placeholder, or that several machines carry at the same time (cloned VMs, templates), are not used.
- The local IP CrowdStrike last reported for the endpoint, together with the same hostname.
- The same hostname, the same Private IP and hostname, or the same hostname in the shared names.
- The FQDN built from hostname and machine domain, found in another source's names.
- For a host that reports a qualified hostname (for example
laptop-01.contoso.com), its short name in another source's names, provided both sides agree on the DNS domain where both have a real one. An mDNS or home-router suffix such as.localor.lancounts as no domain. - The same local IP, when the endpoint's names do not contradict the hostname.
The name-based steps (4 to 6) never take an endpoint that already carries a different Falcon device ID: the same hostname in another domain, or a reused address and name, belongs to another machine. A local IP that is a virtual interface is not used for matching.
Related integrations
- CrowdStrike asset owner — resolves who uses a host, from logon telemetry
- CrowdStrike process events — process execution history per host
- CrowdStrike applications: business applications and data platforms on servers
- CrowdStrike identities: user identities from Falcon Identity Protection
All of them can share one API client if you would rather manage a single credential, but each needs its own scopes.
See also
- Integrations overview — the shared configuration model
- Assets — inspecting which source asserted an attribute