Active Directory users (WIP)
Imports user objects from Active Directory, with the account-hygiene attributes that make a directory export worth having — delegation flags, password policy state and lockouts.
| Type name | active_directory_users |
| Creates | Users |
| Runs on | A sensor, or as an isolated integration with an uploaded CSV |
| Presence flag | active_directory_user_exits |
| Field prefix | active_directory_user_ |
What it contributes
- Identity — name, display name, given name, surname, SAM account name, UPN, distinguished name, object GUID, SID, SID history, email address
- Organisation — department, title, description, member of
- Account state — enabled, locked out, account expiration date, user account control, created, last logon date
- Password state — password last set, password never expires, password not required, last bad password attempt
- Delegation — trusted for delegation, trusted to auth for delegation, does not require pre-auth
It writes the shared user fields user_full_name (from the display name),
user_email (the email address, or the UPN when the email address is empty),
user_department and user_title, but only where the user does not already hold
a value from another source. It also adds the account's distinguished_name to
what the user already holds, writes updated_at, and keeps the source row in
_meta_active_directory_users_scan_result. The last logon date is the sighting it
reports for last_seen and first_seen.
A row whose Enabled column is not True is dropped, so disabled accounts never
create or update a user. The Enabled column is required: without it no row is
imported.
Unlike Active Directory, accounts that never logged on
are kept. Dates are read in the M/d/yyyy h:mm:ss AM/PM, M/d/yyyy H:mm and
d/M/yyyy h:mm:ss AM/PM forms; a date in any other format is left empty.
trusted_for_delegation, trusted_to_auth_for_delegation and
does_not_require_pre_auth are the attributes attackers look for, and they are
rarely set deliberately. Filtering users on them is a five-second hygiene check
that most estates fail somewhere.
Data collection
Like Active Directory, the sensor-side implementation
reads a CSV export. Produce it with the RSAT ActiveDirectory module:
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$props = @(
'AccountExpirationDate','Created','Department','Description','DisplayName',
'DistinguishedName','DoesNotRequirePreAuth','EmailAddress','Enabled','GivenName',
'LastBadPasswordAttempt','LastLogonDate','LockedOut','MemberOf','Name',
'ObjectClass','ObjectGUID','PasswordLastSet','PasswordNeverExpires',
'PasswordNotRequired','SamAccountName','SID','SIDHistory','Surname','Title',
'TrustedForDelegation','TrustedToAuthForDelegation','userAccountControl',
'UserPrincipalName'
)
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties $props |
Select-Object $props |
Export-Csv -NoTypeInformation -Encoding UTF8 .\ad-users.csv
Headers must match those property names; unknown ones are skipped without error.
Run the export in a session whose regional format writes dates as listed under
What it contributes, for example en-US.
Matching
Each row is matched to an existing user by the first rule that finds one:
- SID
- Object GUID
- Distinguished name
- AD name
- AD email address, then the shared
user_email - The AD name against the shared
user_full_name
A row that matches nothing creates a new user, subject to the template's On New Asset Discovered action.
MemberOf is multi-valuedExported to CSV, a multi-valued attribute serialises as a single string. Group membership therefore arrives as text rather than as a list — usable for search, but not as a structured relationship.
Requirements
As for Active Directory, collection is from a CSV export
you supply — here of Get-ADUser — so the requirements fall mostly on whoever
produces that export.
Network access
| From | To | Protocol | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| The sensor running the integration | Nothing — the run parses a CSV export | — | — |
No route from a sensor to a domain controller is needed for the CSV path. The reach
that is needed belongs to the machine where you run Get-ADUser — an already
domain-joined administrative host, using whatever access it normally has.
There is no direct-collection path today. The URL, Username and Password fields are stored but not used: a run on an instance without Isolated Integration ticked fails on the sensor without collecting anything.
Access in Active Directory
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
An account that can run Get-ADUser against the domain | It produces the export; Authenticated Users is enough in a default domain — see Permissions in Active Directory |
The RSAT ActiveDirectory PowerShell module on that host | Get-ADUser ships with it rather than with Windows itself — Data collection has the export command |
In this deployment
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
| Console access to upload the export | In Isolated Integration mode the CSV is supplied through the console rather than collected |
| A registered sensor to select | Sensor is a required field, even though only the isolated mode collects anything. See Sensors |
Configuration
Identical to Active Directory: name, URL, username, password, optional cookies, sensor, ignore SSL, and the Isolated Integration checkbox that switches the instance to operator-supplied CSV upload. Tick Isolated Integration: it is the only mode that collects, and the URL, username and password are not used. Password and Cookies are write-only once saved.
Permissions in Active Directory
Reading user objects needs no privilege beyond Authenticated Users in a default domain. Use a dedicated read-only service account so the reads are attributable.
See also
- Active Directory — computer objects from the same domain
- Azure users — the Entra ID equivalent, including sync state back to on-premises accounts
- Integrations overview — the shared configuration model