Azure users (WIP)
Pulls user identities from Entra ID via Microsoft Graph, then enriches each one with its admin roles, group and team memberships, MFA registration, password hygiene, licences and sign-in activity, and says which paid licences sit on disabled or idle accounts.
| Type name | azure_users |
| Creates | Users |
| Runs on | A sensor with outbound reach to graph.microsoft.com |
| Presence flag | azure_ad_exits |
| Field prefix | azure_ad_ |
What it contributes
- Identity — object ID, display name, given name, UPN, mail, user type
- Contact — mobile phone, business phones, office location, preferred language
- Organisation — job title, department, company name
- Account state — account enabled, created datetime
- Admin roles — the directory roles the user holds, directly or through a
group, including roles scoped to an administrative unit (
azure_ad_roles_*, shown as Admin Roles); whether the user is an admin, and whether any role is one Microsoft labels privileged - Memberships — groups (
azure_ad_groups_*) and teams, each with IDs and display names - MFA — registered, capable, the methods registered, the preferred second factor, passwordless capable, self-service password reset registered
- Password and identity — password last changed, password never expires, password policies, sessions valid from (the last revocation), usage location, every email alias, and the security identifier (SID)
- Licences — licence IDs, SKU IDs and SKU part numbers; the paid licences alone; a License Status and a License Reclaimable flag (see Licence use)
- Hybrid sync — on-premises SAM account name, sync enabled, last sync datetime
- Sign-in activity — last sign-in, last non-interactive sign-in, last successful sign-in
- Licence use signals — read by License Optimization (see
License Optimization):
- last use of each Microsoft 365 service, from the usage reports (Service Activity);
- the newest sign-in to each app (App Sign-in Activity);
- the newest admin change from the audit log (Last Admin Action);
- since when each admin role is held, when each licence was assigned, and since when a disabled account is off (Disabled Since).
A part the run could not read — a permission or licence missing — is left out rather than written as empty, so an earlier scan's values stay.
It writes the shared user fields user_full_name, user_email, user_title,
user_organization, user_department and updated_at.
Licence use
Each user gets one License Status:
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Active | Holds a paid licence and signed in within the idle threshold |
| Idle | Holds a paid licence and has not signed in within the threshold — or never has, and was created before it |
| Disabled | Holds a paid licence on an account that cannot sign in |
| New, not signed in yet | Holds a paid licence, never signed in, created within the threshold |
| Free licenses only | Holds only free or self-service licences |
| Unlicensed | Holds no licence |
License Reclaimable is set for Idle and Disabled. A licence counts as free
when its subscription has 10,000 seats or more — Microsoft's self-service and
viral offers — or by its name (FLOW_FREE, POWER_BI_STANDARD and others).
The threshold is the scan template's License idle after (days), 90 by default.
The integration also installs an Entra ID Security and Licenses dashboard: accounts without MFA, admins without MFA, privileged admins, passwords that never expire or are over a year old, and reclaimable licences by product.
An account with a licence assigned and no successful sign-in for months is either a cost to reclaim or a dormant credential to disable. Both readings argue for the same action, and this is the only source that gives you the pair.
License Optimization
The License Optimization module reads these users to find licences and admin roles that could go, under its Microsoft 365 tab:
- disabled accounts still licensed, after a grace period;
- accounts that never signed in;
- idle guests and inactive users;
- add-on licences nobody uses, judged by each licence's usage signals (Power BI by its app sign-ins, Exchange Online by mail activity, and so on — editable per licence);
- admin roles whose holder did nothing an admin does;
- bought seats nobody is assigned.
Microsoft keeps the sign-in and audit logs for about 30 days. Each scan merges what it sees into what the user already holds, so the history grows with every scan: an admin role is judged against a 90-day threshold once 90 days of history are collected, and left unjudged until then.
Microsoft 365 conceals user names in its usage reports unless a tenant administrator turns that off: Microsoft 365 admin center → Settings → Org settings → Services → Reports → clear Display concealed user, group, and site names in all reports. While names are concealed, service use cannot be tied to users: the module says so and leaves the add-ons judged by it alone.
Requirements
The integration is outbound-only: it is a scheduled Graph client, so nothing is installed in the tenant, nothing runs on the users' machines, and nothing has to reach into the deployment.
Network access
| From | To | Protocol | Port |
|---|---|---|---|
| The sensor running the integration | login.microsoftonline.com — the token endpoint | HTTPS over TCP | 443 |
| The sensor running the integration | graph.microsoft.com — the directory itself | HTTPS over TCP | 443 |
Two hosts, because authentication and data live in different services: the run takes a client-credentials token from the first, then pages the directory from the second. If the sensor reaches the internet through a proxy, point Proxy settings at it rather than opening direct egress.
Access in Entra ID
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
| An account that can register applications | The credential is an app registration with a client secret |
| An account that can grant tenant-wide admin consent | Every permission is an application permission, which are inert until consented — see Permissions in Entra ID |
| Entra ID P1 or above, for sign-in activity and MFA registration | Both are licensed; without P1 the run still succeeds and those fields are left out |
In this deployment
| Need | Why |
|---|---|
| A registered, healthy sensor | The integration runs on a sensor, on the platform's schedule — see Sensors |
There are no special host requirements beyond a sensor that is checking in. Note that the per-user calls make this a long-running integration on a large tenant, so prefer a sensor that is reliably up over the smallest one available.
Configuration
| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Name | Yes | Label for this instance |
| Application (client) ID | Yes | App registration client ID |
| Directory (tenant) ID | Yes | Entra tenant ID |
| Client secret | No | Required in practice for client-credentials auth |
| Proxy settings | No | http://host:port |
| Sensor | Yes | Sensor that will run the integration |
| Ignore SSL | No | Skips certificate validation |
The scan template adds License idle after (days): how long a licensed account may go without signing in before its licence counts as reclaimable. Default 90, from 1 to 3650.
Permissions in Entra ID
Register an application and grant admin consent for these application permissions on Microsoft Graph:
| Permission | Needed for |
|---|---|
User.Read.All | The user list and per-user detail |
Directory.Read.All | memberOf — groups and teams; the tenant's licence subscriptions |
AuditLog.Read.All | signInActivity, the MFA registration report, the sign-in log and the directory audit log |
Reports.Read.All | The Microsoft 365 usage reports: last use of each service |
RoleManagement.Read.Directory | Admin roles, from the tenant's role assignments |
UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All | Optional: per-user authentication methods, used for MFA when the report is unavailable |
The run authenticates with client credentials and reads these once for the whole tenant:
- the MFA registration report (
/reports/authenticationMethods/userRegistrationDetails); - the role assignments (
/roleManagement/directory/roleAssignments); - the licence subscriptions (
/subscribedSkus), with their bought and assigned seats; - the Microsoft 365 usage reports (
getOffice365ActiveUserDetail,getM365AppUserDetail); - the last 30 days of successful sign-ins (
/auditLogs/signIns) and of the directory audit log (/auditLogs/directoryAudits), read page by page and never held whole.
It then pages /v1.0/users and per user reads memberOf, licenseDetails,
appRoleAssignments and a $select projection that includes signInActivity,
the assigned service plans and the password fields.
The connection test names each of these reads the credential cannot make.
AuditLog.Read.All and a P1 licenceGraph only returns signInActivity for tenants with Entra ID P1 or above, and
only when the audit-log permission is consented. Without either, the sign-in
fields come back empty while the rest of the run succeeds — a silent partial
result rather than a failure.
Roles, licences and app-role assignments are fetched one user at a time. On a large tenant the first run takes a while and is sensitive to Graph throttling.
See also
- Active Directory users — the on-premises
counterpart;
azure_ad_onpremises_sam_account_nameis what ties the two together - Atlassian users — SaaS identities
- Integrations overview — the shared configuration model